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SHARING ACCESS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THROUGH
PRIVATE ORDERING
S1tVERINE DUSOLLIER*
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property is a complex mix of different interests that either
protects an intellectual creation by an exclusive and proprietary right or
guarantees some free access to, and use of, an intellectual creation. The
intellectual property ("IP") laws accommodate these different and often
contradictory interests--oscillating between propriety and freedom; exclu-
sivity and sharing; and privatization and socialization. Property and exclu-
sivity are at the core of the intellectual rights-the grant of an exclusive
right to the creator in her artistic work or to an inventor in her invention is
the primary objective of copyright and patent laws and has all the charac-
teristics of a private property right. Nevertheless, there are many avenues
within the intellectual property regime enabling collective access to and use
of protected objects. The copyright and patent regimes can equally be de-
scribed as engines of public availability. The duration of patent rights and
copyrights are limited, leaving, by the lapse of time, a number of intellec-
tual creations free for everybody to use. Some products of the mind are
excluded from protection-sometimes only to prevent an exploitation of an
invention that would adversely harm morality or public policy but more
often to ensure free and collective access.1 Limitations on the scope of the
exclusive rights conferred by patent or copyright also enable the public, in
some circumstances, to use the work or invention without the fear of com-
* Professor, University of Namur, Belgium. The author wishes to thank Lionel Bentley, Graeme
Dinwoodie, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Arti Rai, and Philippe Laurent for their comments on an earlier draft, as
well as all participants of the Conference on Intellectual Property and Trade and Development held at
the Chicago-Kent College of Law where this Article was presented and discussed.
I. Exclusions from copyrightability and patentability are quite diverse depending on the coun-
tries. In almost all national regimes, except the United Kingdom, official texts are barred from copy-
right protection. A notable exclusion from patentability in Europe are inventions that would be contrary
to "ordre public" or morality. The European Directive of 1998 on the Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions has given some examples, including human cloning, the modification of the genetic identity
of humans, or the production of chimeras. Other exclusions from patents are justified by the abstract or
non-technical nature of the invention, such as algorithms or business methods, at least in the European
patent system.
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mitting an infringement. No intellectual right encompasses the knowledge
and enjoyment of the work or invention-what one could call intellectual
access to the creation. Patent law expressly protects and promotes intellec-
tual access by imposing divulgation of the invention as a counterpart to the
exclusivity. Copyright, even though more insidiously, does not reach the
intellectual enjoyment of works. No exclusive right extends to the mere
reception, reading, listening, or viewing of the work regardless of the in-
creasing tendency of copyright provisions to allow for such encroachment
upon private enjoyment of works.2
As a consequence, intellectual property regimes are not solely a field
of private appropriation. Intertwined with the exclusive right of property is
a public domain-realms of intellectual resources access to and use of
which are collectively enjoyed by the public. 3 At least if one adopts a broad
view of the public domain embracing not only what is not privatized under
the intellectual property regime but what is left outside the copyright or
patent and, equally important, those resources that might be copyrighted or
patented but that are yet open in the sense that their use is not limited by
intellectual property rules.4 Aligning the private domain of exclusivity and
the public domain of collective use within one regime of intellectual prop-
erty is another way of describing the balance of interests embedded in
copyright or patent laws-their inherent blend of exclusivity and collectiv-
ity. 5 This assortment of property and commons-which fundamentally
distinguishes intellectual property from the traditional right of property in a
tangible-is normally achieved through traditional law making and through
the public ordering process which is more capable of taking into account all
interests involved.
This settlement formula may certainly make some people unhappy.
Copyright or patent owners might argue that their rights are too limited and
make a claim for an extension of their monopoly or a strengthening of their
2. The expanding reach of copyright provisions over the mere use of copyrighted work is mainly
due to the expansion of the reproduction right over temporary copies (in Europe at least) and to the
legal protection of technological measures that are broadly defined to include technology controlling the
use and reception of works. See Sverine Dusollier, Technology as an Imperative for Regulating Copy-
right: From the Public Exploitation to the Private Use of the Work, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 201
(2005).
3. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1331, 1340 (2004); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the
Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN
INFORMATION LAW 121 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bemt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
4. This view is further elaborated in S~verine Dusollier, Mapping the Public Domain in Intellec-
tual Property: Beyond the Metaphor of a Domain (June 2006) (working paper, on file with the Univer-
sitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix Namur), available at http://www.crid.be/pdf/public/5422.pdf.
5. This balance exists in all IP regimes even if the composition of the mixture, its ingredients, or
their respective parts might be different from one country to another.
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rights.6 Users of artistic works or inventions may believe that their freedom
is far too narrow-that some uses should not be judged to be infringements
at all. Other stakeholders might believe that their interests have not been
taken into account in the overall balance. All of them can benefit from the
public nature of the law-making process in a democratic society and lobby
for a better consideration of their interests.
When stakeholders fail to succeed in the law-making process they still
have the ability to seek recourse in other processes of lawmaking. Recent
IP history is rich in examples of such "regime shifting ' 7 where dissatisfied
stakeholders look outside the IP regime to ensure their interests are best
taken into account. IP questions are sometimes pursued in other forums not
primarily in charge of such matters--demonstrated by the discussions
around biodiversity that have raised the protection of sovereignty over bio-
genetic resources as well as the various IP aspects. Issues involving IP are
often dealt with by bodies as diverse as the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion ("FAO"), the World Health Organization ("WHO"), or United Na-
tions' organizations in charge of human rights. Non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") have been particularly prompt to follow these non-
IP strategies, with relative success.
Recourse to private ordering mechanisms has also been a favorite
method for protecting one's interests beyond the protection devoted by the
copyright or patent laws.8 Generally, use of private ordering mechanisms
has been a way to expand the monopoly granted by the law and to constrain
or prevent the free use of resources by the public. The deployment of con-
tracts and technological measures to pursue that goal has been thoroughly
discussed in copyright doctrine, 9 a bit less in patent law. 10 Private ordering
6. As they have exceedingly and systematically done in recent years.
7. See Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of Inter-
national Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
8. Private ordering operates when "the rule-making process regarding the use of information is
privatized, and the legal power to define the boundaries of public access to information is delegated to
private parties." Niva Elkin-Koren, A Public-Regarding Approach to Contracting over Copyrights, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 191, 192 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harry First & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman
eds., 2001).
9. See e.g., Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transac-
tions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1090 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35
JURIMETRICS J. 311, 319 (1995); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Order-
ing: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998); Pamela
Samuelson, Copyright, Commodification, and Censorship: Past As Prologue-But to What Future?, in
THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 63, 72 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds.,
2002).
10. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Legal Constraint of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies, 6 MINN.
J.L. SCi. & TECH. 335 (2004).
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mechanisms rely upon contractual or technical means to enforce owners'
rights but also to inflate their rights so as to cover uses that have been held
legally non-infringing. This is done by locking up public domain works or
by preventing fair uses or other limitations on the intellectual property
rights. The main consequence of such private initiatives is to cause a shift
from the balance embedded in the law-crafted through the law-making
process-to a unilaterally determined norm of usage of intellectual assets., I
Most surprising is the use of private ordering mechanisms by the pro-
ponents of public access to works-the other side of the balance-to coun-
teract IP expansion instead of intensifying it. From open-source software to
open-access initiatives in artistic creation, scientific publications, or bio-
technological inventions, licensing is now employed to promote a collec-
tive access to, and sharing of, intellectual resources produced and
distributed through a logic opposed to proprietary exclusion.
All these private initiatives-which we can gather under the umbrella
term of "open access"-share the desire to subvert the IP regime from
within. Not content with lobbying against the ongoing strengthening of
copyright and patent laws, proponents of open access avail themselves of
private ordering to change the exercise of such rights, thereby attempting to
effectively undermine them. In the open-access narrative, copyright or
patent rights are exercised to share and socialize intellectual property-
counter to the very meaning of the exclusivity that characterizes it. Ironi-
cally, it also signifies that the public interest in the dissemination of works
and inventions is now ensured by such private initiatives, whereas intensi-
fying IP private protection-with no proven effect on the overall public
interest-is increasingly pursued by public ordering.
Similar to its use to expand intellectual property rights, private order-
ing deployed to enhance sharing and to open access to creations has a
normative effect. On an initial level open-access licenses regulate the use
of the works or inventions to which they apply. The licensee has rights and
obligations arising from the license governing the intellectual asset she
wants to use. More importantly, open-access licensing schemes seek to
cause a normative change in the way intellectual property rights are exer-
cised. Sharing is advocated as a new norm in copyright and patent. A pow-
erful discourse and ideology is voiced by the open-access movement-not
only do they exercise IP rights differently, they hope their model will sig-
nify a real and durable change in the law itself. In order to propagate that
new ethos, open-access licenses include a trick that aims at contaminating
11. See Dusollier, supra note 2, at 203-04.
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any modified or improved work or invention first licensed under such a
scheme. This so-called copylefi feature of open-access schemes endeavors
to attach the sharing norm to the intellectual resource itself-not only to the
contractual parties. The copyleft feature can lead to a particular provision
or regulation applying to any user of the work or invention-almost equat-
ing the contract to a right against the world. Mere private ordering tools
would then seemingly gain a public-ordering dimension.
This Article aims at assessing the nature of mechanisms of lawmaking
operated by open-access initiatives, as well as its normative sustainability
as a project to enlarge the public domain within intellectual property. As a
norm-creating process, does the private ordering method, particularly when
used for sharing objectives, form a regulatory force in IP to be reckoned
with? What are the ideological and legal tools deployed by such a model
that could mimic a normative effect similar to that of the law? Can they
contribute to give open-access licensing the features of a valid and general
norm?
A second question will address the international dimension of the
open-access norm making. Open-access schemes seek to operate as a
global mechanism, enabling the sharing of intellectual products across bor-
ders. Since open-access advocates a global and broad availability of intel-
lectual creations, its discourse seduces less-developed countries that
imagine they could find in open access a useful tool to collectivize intellec-
tual assets and to counteract the expansion of IP and exclusionary practices
within 1P.12 Therefore, the open-access strategy might have an international
impact as a norm-making process, which begs the question of its normative
sustainability on a global scale. Is its international dimension sufficiently
constructed and solid to rival international law making that nowadays
shapes most of the intellectual property regime? Should such models that
aim at reducing the IP monopolies rest upon a solid international founda-
tion and include peculiarities of other markets and countries, they could be
an alternative route (though parallel to multilateral law making) to explore
for developing countries, allowing them to assess their own capability to
foster national innovation. These models may allow developing countries
to loosen the intellectual property corset that has constricted them since the
12. It should be noted that equating the interests of less-developed countries with the strategy of
gathering intellectual property would unduly simplify the matter. For instance, the less-developed
countries in the Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992 have achieved recognition of a privatiza-
tion of biological resources through the sovereignty principle and the ensuing benefit-sharing rule. See
Ikechi Mgbeoji, Beyond Rhetoric: State Sovereignty, Common Concern, and the Inapplicability of the
Common Heritage Concept to Plant Genetic Resources, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 821, 827-28, 836-37
(2003).
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enactment of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS").
Questions other than those involving the validity of the open-access
initiatives as a norm-making process will not be examined. For instance, I
will not discuss the possible success of this movement as a content-
production process-whether open access can effectively succeed to create
and propagate more open intellectual content. 13 I will also not consider
whether open access can really succeed in satisfying the needs and de-
mands of the developing countries for another IP regime.14
Part I of this Article discusses the development of the open-access
movement and explains the different projects that were born out of it-
from the pioneers in open-source software to the very recent attempts of
sharing norms in the patent field. Part II will assess the nature and mecha-
nism of the norm deployed by the open-access scenarios and will underline
its unsolvable contradiction as a norm caught between a private ordering
device and a public interest ideology and objective. Part III will look into
the geographical scope and meaning of some open-access projects in order
to consider whether and how the international dimension has been taken
into account in the elaboration of the open-access norms.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE OPEN-ACCESS INITIATIVES
Since the creation of open-source software, open-access initiatives
have flourished in many fields. 15 Open-access initiatives have embraced a
differing terminology-ranging from "open source" to "commons." Open
source is the germinal term that has embraced a myriad of licenses govern-
ing free software. It insists on the core obligation arising from such li-
censes-the obligation to provide the source code of the software. The
movement or licenses promoting non-proprietary software are also gener-
ally dubbed as F/OSS, standing for Free/Open-Source Software.
13. For the adequacy of the open-source model to the software environment, see Yochai Benkler,
Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002). For a discussion
about the use of Creative Commons in artistic creation, see S~verine Dusollier, The Master's Tools v.
the Master's House: Creative Commons v. Copyright, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 271 (2005). For the
suitability of the open-source model for biotechnology, see David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin 's Ge-
nome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167 (2004); Arti K. Rai,
"Open and Collaborative" Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 131 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2005),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-574863 (dealing with the biopharmaceutical industry).
14. See, e.g., Shruti Ahuja-Cogny, Interrogations on a Passion-Filled Debate on Open-Source
Software and the Digital Divide, I INFO. TECH. & INT'L. DEV. 60 (2004).
15. For an early example of the idea that the principles of open source could benefit other fields
than software, see Ira V. Heffan, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 1487 (1997).
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While the principles of open source have spread beyond software,
these open-source initiatives have forsaken the "source" element-referred
to instead as "open access" or "open content." The "source" element is not
as relevant in the context of artistic creations, texts, or other types of intel-
lectual material. "Source" is even less relevant in the patent field where one
key principle is to ensure the disclosure of the invention. 16 The openness of
the resource, whether such openness lies in its access or use, is empha-
sized. 17 Following a body of literature applying the economic concept of
the "commons" to intellectual property, 18 many projects have borrowed
that word to signify the newly gained communality of the resources that the
open access and sharing initiatives could yield. The term "commons-based
initiatives" has sometimes served to designate sharing projects in copyright
or patent fields. 19
However, the general expression "open source" is still used to encom-
pass an ideological movement that is rooted in this first application of open
sharing in the software field. Also taken from the open-source software, the
term "copyleft" gained momentum in the open-access schemes and in the
literature describing them. Copyleft is an ambiguous word because it can
be understood in a broad or strict sense. In a broad sense, copyleft can be
used as a synonym of open source or open access. It results from a play on
words where copyleft stands in a stark contrast with copyright-"left" ver-
sus "right"-but also progressive versus conservative, "right" as legal enti-
tlement versus "left" as relinquishment of the property. Given its semantic
opposition to copyright, the application of that terminology to non-
proprietary projects in the patent field makes less sense, although copyleft
has now gained a life of its own, depicting the exercise of an intellectual
property right not based on exclusion.20 In a more strict sense, copyleft
refers to a particular mechanism in open-source or open-access licenses by
which the anti-exclusion effect propagates along the derivative works cre-
16. Sara Boettiger & Dan L. Burk, Open Source Patenting, I J. INT'L BIOTECHNOLOGY L. 221,
224 (2004).
17. See the terminology of "open and collaborative science" used by Rai, supra note 13, at 132.
18. See LAWRENCE LESSiG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 84 (2001); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37 (2003); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:
The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 538-39 (1998); Ben
Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 458 (2002); Eli M. Salzberger, Economic Analysis of the Public Domain,
in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 3, at 27; see also Robert A. Heverly, The Informa-
tion Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127 (2003).
19. See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183
(2004).
20. Some also use the term "patent-left." See Janet Hope, Open Source Genetics: A Conceptual
Framework 12 (May 22, 2006) (unpublished article, on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review).
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ated from the original work licensed in open source. Also called the "viral
nature," the copyleft effect is a key element of the norm-making machine
set in motion by the open-access movement.
I will use hereafter the terminology of "open access" to embrace all
sharing and commons-based initiatives.
A. Open-Access Initiatives in the Copyright and Patent Fields
1. Open-Source Software
The history of the open-source software is now well known and
documented.2 1 Reacting to the early development-along with the trans-
formation of software into a mass commodity-of licensing practices
aimed at restricting the "rights of use" of software and of the increasing
closure of the source code, Richard Stallman imagined a new model of
software distribution-a return to a model that would fit more closely with
the habits of the programmers' community. This alternate framework was
named "free software" in order to convey the necessary axiom of this new
model-the freedom to access and use the software. In his founding text
Why Software Should Be Free, Stallman explains that "[m]y conclusion is
that programmers have the duty to encourage others to share, redistribute,
study, and improve the software we write: in other words, to write free
software., 22
The history of open-source software then took different paths. Richard
Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation, which has developed and
continues to manage the General Public License ("GPL")-the first license
embedding the free software principles. The development of the operating
system Linux by a student quickly gave a market pedigree to the idea of
free software, demonstrating the possible commercial success of this new
model. A schism occurred in 1998 when less radical programmers launched
the Open Source Initiative whose objective was to develop open-source
principles that could be seen not only as a confrontation to the practices of
the software industry but that could be part of a business strategy. They
invented the term "open source" to emphasize not the freedom to use but
the necessity to make the source code of the software available. This meet-
21. See LESSIG, supra note 18, at 49-72; Heffan, supra note 15, at 1490-97.
22. Richard M. Stallman, Why Software Should be Free, in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY:
SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 119, 119 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002), available at
http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/shouldbefree.html.
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ing also gave birth to the Open Source Definition, 23 which lays down the
key elements and provisions that a license should include to merit the open-
source label. This definition contains ten "commandments" 24 that form a
sort of label certificate. They combine the four basic freedoms that a free or
open-source license should grant-(I) the freedom to run the program, for
any users or purpose (e.g., for commercial purpose or not); (2) the right to
get access to source code; (3) the freedom to redistribute copies; and (4) the
freedom to improve the program and release improvements if wished.
The legal instrument of the open-source software is the license. One
estimate is that there are more than one hundred open-source licenses in
use worldwide. The GPL takes the biggest share of the licenses now em-
ployed on the market. Licenses can be classified in two categories: the
copyleft or non-copyleft licenses. The copyleft licenses, to which the GPL
belongs, have a viral nature. The license applies automatically-along the
chain of distribution-to each new copy of software as well as to each de-
rivative or adapted version of the software. The person responsible for a
modification of the software developed and distributed in a free model is
no longer able to impose restrictions other than those permitted by the
original license. The free/open-source qualification of the software is said
to contaminate each derivative work based on it. The objective is to prevent
a piece of software written and distributed in open source from being modi-
fied and captured in a proprietary manner. In other words, the goal is to
keep the software free even if it is the subject of modifications and im-
provements.
The copyleft provision is not a necessary feature of all open-source li-
censes. Some do not include such a viral effect while still fulfilling the
basic definition of an open-source license. Those are the non-copyleft li-
censes. This distinction will have its importance in the norm-making effect
of the open-source licenses.
23. See Open Source Initiative OSI: The Open Source Definition, http://www.opensource.org/
docs/definition.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Open Source Definition].
24. The ten commandments are (1) the redistribution of the software has to be freely allowed by
the license; (2) "[tlhe program must include source code, and must allow distribution in source code as
well as compiled form"; (3) "[t]he license must allow modifications and derived works, and must allow
them to be distributed under the same terms as the license of the original software"; (4) the integrity of
the source code of each contributor can be protected by the license, e.g., by requiring derived works to
carry a different name or version number from the original software; (5) "[t]he license must not dis-
criminate against any person or group of persons"; (6) "[tjhe license must not restrict anyone from
making use of the program in a specific field of endeavor"; (7) "[t]he rights attached to the program
must apply to all to whom the program is redistributed"; (8) the license must not be specific to a product
or a particular mode of software distribution; (9) "[t]he license must not place restrictions on other
software that is distributed along with the licensed software"; (10) the license must be technology-
neutral and not depend upon particular technology or style of interface. Id.
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It is important to stress the claimed interrelationship between the free-
doms granted to the users of an open-source program and the values of
exchange and sharing of knowledge that the computer programmers-
attracted to an open-source model-argue form the core principles of pro-
gramming and computer science research. The cooperative process and
peer-based production of software as well as the reciprocal sharing of inno-
vation are regularly put forward to justify the appropriateness of the free
software scheme. 25
2. Creative Commons
Lawrence Lessig, a well-known scholar in cyberspace law, has fol-
lowed Richard Stallman and the overall open-source movement by imagin-
ing the transposition of the copyleft model at work in free software to other
types of creation.2 6 He founded the Creative Commons ("CC") project and
organization in 2001. The main objective of Creative Commons parallels
that of the free software movement-to grant basic freedoms of copying
and distributing a copyrighted work to users-but has devised licenses
applicable to any type of literary and artistic work and not only software. 27
Besides developing licenses applicable outside of software, Creative
Commons departs from the open-source model used in software by giving
the author choices between different licenses. Each license grants diverse
rights to the user. When deciding to license her work under Creative Com-
mons, an author can choose whether she will allow the work to be modified
by the user, whether she wants to limit uses of her work to non-commercial
purposes, and whether she wants to oblige the user to grant the same free-
dom of use when the latter modifies the work and publicly communicates
the derivative work. Regardless of which Creative Commons license the
author chooses, a work should be attributed to its author when it is dis-
seminated. 2 8
Creative Commons offers six different licenses for the author to
choose from, divided into three basic characteristics: Commercial/Non-
Commercial, Derivative Works/Non-Derivative Works, and Share
25. See Benkler, supra note 13.
26. See LESSIG, supra note 18, at 177-200; LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA
USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 183-200
(2004).
27. See Creative Commons, About Us, http://creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited Feb.
21,2007).
28. Id.
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Alike/Non-Share Alike. 29 Each license grants a worldwide, royalty-free,
non-exclusive, perpetual license to the user to reproduce, display, perform,
communicate, and distribute copies of the work. Depending on the type of
license selected, the right to create derivative works or to use the work for
commercial purposes might also be granted. All rights not expressly
granted by the licensor are reserved with the exception of limitations to
copyright that are not prejudiced by the license. The so-called Share Alike
licenses require that the further distribution of derivative works be made
under the same license terms, which resembles the copyleft effect con-
tained in most open-source software licenses.
Each license is then labeled with some symbols that represent the ba-
sic rights granted by the license, which help the user (due to the success of
the Creative Commons project and its iconography) to immediately recog-
nize the type of license governing the distribution of the work. Creative
Commons licenses have been applied worldwide to a vast array of copy-
righted works. It is now recognized as a successful project that challenges
the basic assumptions of copyright regulation. To a certain extent, Creative
Commons can be said to provide a useful answer to the needs of some
communities of creators who might consider sharing as the normal way of
disseminating their creation, whether artistic, informational, scientific or
functional .30
3. Open-Source Patent
The patent field has also found inspiration in open-source initiatives.
The move is more recent and differs from open access in copyright in many
ways. Numerous projects have been developed, mostly in the biotechno-
logical field.31 Their common principle is to resist the increasing patenting
of the results of biotechnological research and the ensuing fear that access
either to basic research tools or to genes whose patentability is dubious
might be unduly impeded.32 Scientists and researchers have become in-
29. For a list of these licenses, basic information about each, and links to more information, see
Creative Commons, Creative Commons Licenses, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/meet-the-
licenses (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
30. See Dusollier, supra note 13.
31. For a description of some projects, see Kenneth Neil Cukier, Open Source Biotech: Can a
Non-Proprietary Approach to Intellectual Property Work in the Life Sciences?, 1 ACUMEN J. LIFE SCI.
(2003), available at http://www.cukier.com/writings/opensourcebiotech.html; Robin Feldman, The
Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is it Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 117, 122-35
(2004).
32. On the rampant commodification of scientific commons, see Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698
(1998).
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creasingly opposed to the trend of the biotech industry to patent more and
more biotechnological inventions. They have developed a strong ethos of
sharing and a desire to keep the scientific commons available to all. 33 This
ethos's practical realization takes many forms. 34
A primary open-access model can be found in the release of scientific
research data in publicly available databases. 35 This has been the choice of
many industries and research centers working in genomics. Namely, the
Human Genome Project decided early on to release its data into the public
domain and not to claim patent rights in any part of the genome resulting
from its mapping.36 Private companies have also endorsed a public domain
policy. For example, Merck sponsored a cDNA sequencing effort whose
results were promptly and publicly disclosed. Nowadays, most of the ge-
netic databases are freely accessible.
The policy of public disclosure of genetic data was justified by ideo-
logical reasons-similar to the ethos of the software open-source commu-
nity-to create a commons of genetic information free for everybody to
use. But it was also interlaced with a strategy of defensive publication be-
cause the disclosure of identified sequences prevented their patenting. The
open-access move was thus also used as a means to thwart an exclusionary
appropriation of an invention, which is another key feature of the open-
source movement.
Yet it was not considered sufficient by some. Generally, open access
to cDNA databases is not restricted in any way, which gave rise to the con-
cern that products made from such genetic information or downstream
improvements might be captured by patents and removed from the public
domain. For example, the rice genome project placed masses of informa-
tion into the public domain, most of which enabled private companies to
develop applications such as genetic markers, specific genotypes related to
nutrition, new quality of fibers, or targets for herbicides for which they
filed a patent application.
33. Some biotech projects also employ open-source software to annotate genome data. For exam-
ple, see the EnsembI Genome Browser and the license they apply to the use of their software. Ensembl,
Software License, http://www.ensembl.org/info/about/codelicence.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
34. For models enhancing access to patents in the biotechnology field, other than open source, see
Geertrui Van Overwalle et al., Models for Facilitating Access to Patents on Genetic Inventions, 7
NATURE REv./GENETICS 143 (2006).
35. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case
of Large-Scale cDNA Sequencing, 3 U. CHIC. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557 (1996); Alexander K. Hass,
The Wellcome Trust's Disclosures of Gene Sequence Data into the Public Domain & the Potential for
Proprietary Rights in the Human Genome, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 145 (2001).
36. On this policy and the subsequent choice not to use an open-source system, see John Sulston,
Intellectual Property and the Human Genome, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 61, 66 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002).
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The application of open-source principles to such databases was then
thought of as a way to avoid such shortcomings of public accessibility. One
early example was the HapMap project, whose objective is to identify ge-
netic variations called haplotypes which describe the common patterns of
human DNA sequence variation and help researchers to detect possible
causes of or susceptibility to diseases. At the beginning of the project,
HapMap developed a copyleft model based on the GPL license. In order to
ensure that the data remained in the public domain, the data was made
available on the Internet under a license that prevented licensees from re-
stricting access to the data or patenting any invention that could result from
access to such data. The licensees could file a patent application for identi-
fied phenotypes such as disease susceptibility, drug responsiveness, or
other biological utility so long as public access to-and use of-the data
produced by the HapMap project was preserved. 3 7 Given that such an ac-
cess policy preserves the openness of innovations based on the data gov-
erned by the license, it implies virality qualifying for the "copyleft" label
invented in open-source software. Even though this licensing scheme has
now been abandoned by the HapMap project it could still serve as a model
for analysis and inspiration in other bio-databanks projects.
More radical is the proposition to apply open-source licensing princi-
ples to the patented invention itself and not only to unpatentable informa-
tion or inventions whose inventors have decided not to patent. The most
notable project is the Biological Innovation for Open Society ("BiOS")
project, launched by the Australian organization CAMBIA.38 CAMBIA
operates in the field of agricultural biotechnology. The owner of some pat-
ents in critical crop genetics technologies, CAMBIA has opted for a licens-
ing mechanism that would guarantee that any improvement of its
technology remains free to use for all participants in the initiative. Two
particular licenses have been developed: the first one covers patented plant
molecular enabling technologies while a second applies to health-related
technologies and is not limited to plants. 39 All BiOS agreements aim at
providing for a world-wide, non-exclusive, royalty-free right to make and
use the technology, and at conferring such freedoms to any improvements
of the technology through a "grant-back" mechanism. Both in the HapMap
and BIOS projects, improvements of the licensed technology or data can
37. See International HapMap Project, Data Access Policy, http://www.hapmap.org/ datarelease-
policy.html.en (last visited Feb. 21, 2007) [hereinafter HapMap Data Access Policy].
38. See CAMBIA, http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
39. BiOS, What BiOS-Compliant Agreements are Available?, http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/
licenses/398/2534.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
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still be patented, but existing rights in such improvements cannot exclude
the licensor and other licensees within the protected commons.
In a recent article, 40 scholars from Yale, including Yochai Benkler,
elaborate on these commons-based practices in biotechnology and devise a
twofold licensing scheme based on open access and copyleft principles to
take into account two predominant concerns of developing or poorer coun-
tries regarding pharmaceutical research.4 1 The first license, named the Eq-
uitable Access License, purports to include clauses in the technology
transfer licenses that universities enter into with pharmaceutical companies
governing drugs or pharmaceutical inventions elaborated in academic re-
search and laboratories. 42 Such clauses would request industry licensees to
allow manufacturers of generic medicines the right to sell such generic
drugs in poorer countries. 43 Under the second license, the Neglected Dis-
ease License, universities could also promote research in neglected diseases
(which constitute a minor part of the research occurring in pharmaceutics
but a major part of diseases in less developed countries) by granting to
those engaged in neglected disease research the right to use and experiment
with technologies invented by such universities as well as to market de-
rived innovations in countries afflicted with such diseases.
A viral nature characterizes both licenses. The Equitable Access Li-
cense provides that any rights in an end product developed by the licensee
on the basis of the technology produced by the university must be trans-
ferred to the university via a grant-back and cross-licensing structure. 44
This cross-license is restricted to the sole purpose of creating an automatic
sub-license flowing from the university to any third party who wants to
supply a developing country. 45 This grant-back provision also applies to
any improvements made to the product covered by such license-
improvements made to adapt it to the peculiar needs of patients in develop-
ing countries in a similar way and for the same limited purpose.46 The li-
cense is not free on a monetary level since it includes a mechanism to
receive royalties, albeit minimal, and to divide them between the university
and the licensee. The Neglected Disease License does not necessarily re-
40. Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler, Addressing Global
Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1031 (2005).
41. Id. at 1090.
42. Id. at 1094.
43. Id. at 1100.
44. Id. at 1100-01.
45. Id. at 1100.
46. Id. at 1105.
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quire a viral contamination to improvements, even though the proposal
imagines capturing any improvements made by the licensee on the univer-
sity's technology, enabling researchers working on such diseases to freely
use the tools and products developed by the university as well as any im-
provements.47 Unlike the Equitable Access License, no royalty would be
due to the university nor to the licensee.
By promoting free access to its patented inventions and by trying to
preserve that freedom along the development of the technology, the BiOS
project and the licenses dedicated to access to medicines adhere to the open
access or open-source ideology, 48 even though their legal technique-the
grant-back mechanism-slightly differs from the copyleft or viral feature
of other open-source licenses.49 That methodological difference will have
an influence on their normative process.
4. Open-Access in the Field of Scientific Publications
Open-access ideology has also spread to the field of scientific publica-
tions where it has been seen as a strategy for counteracting the increasing
commodification of scientific publications and the reduced availability of
scientific knowledge. 50 In the realm of scientific publications, the open-
access dogma has been applied by putting in place free electronic distribu-
tion of scholarly journals in almost all fields of science.
Open-access ideology in the realm of scientific publications has been
aided by the Budapest Open Access Initiative. The Budapest Open Access
Initiative was launched in 2001 with the aid of the Open Society Institute.51
Its objective was to launch new journals to which access would be free and
to convert old ones to open access. In 2003 many research organizations,
universities, libraries, research funding agencies, and publishers signed the
Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Hu-
manities. This declaration requires authors associated with the signatories
47. Id. at 1110.
48. On the compatibility between this model and the norms of science and whether open-source
patenting can fit with the need of the biotech industry and/or researchers' needs, see Richard R. Nelson,
The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons, 33 RES. POL'Y. 455 (2004); Opderbeck, supra note
13,at 186-89.
49. Given the power retained by the original inventor and licensor on any developments through
the grant-back technique, some scholars do not consider the BiOS license a proper open-source license.
On this point see Hope, supra note 20, at 20.
50. See Andr6s Guadamuz Gonzdlez, Open Science: Open Source Licenses in Scientific Research,
7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 321, 324-30, 332 (2006); Lucie Guibault, On Owning the Right to Open Up
Access to Scientific Publications (Apr. 20, 2006) (unpublished article, on file with Chicago-Kent Law
Review).
51. See Budapest Open Access Initiative, http://www.soros.org/openaccess (last visited Feb. 21,
2007).
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to grant to all users a free worldwide right to access their works and re-
quires that the works be deposited in at least one online repository enabling
open access, unrestricted distribution, interoperability, and long-term ar-
chiving. 52 Its follow-on recommendation states that
[i]n order to implement the Berlin Declaration institutions should im-
plement a policy to: (1) require their researchers to deposit a copy of all
their published articles in an open access repository and (2) encourage
their researchers to publish their research articles in open access journals
where a suitable journal exists (and provide the support to enable that to
happen).53
Many open-access online journals or databases of scientific papers al-
ready existed or were born in recent years,54 such as the European Integra-
tion online Papers ("EIoP"), 55 the Social Science Research Network
("SSRN"), 56 the Forum Qualitative Social Research,5 7 the Scientific Elec-
tronic Library Online ("SciELO"), 5 8 the European Research Papers Ar-
chive ("ERPA"),59 Public Library of Science ("PLoS"), 60 and BioMed
Central 6' comprised of more than 120 journals. Some are specifically
aimed at developing countries such as the Health InterNetwork Access to
Research Initiative, 62 supported by the UN, or the Access to Global Online
Research in Agriculture ("AGORA"),6 3 operated by the FAO.
Such initiatives are mostly ideological manifestos-they have not yet
set up any particular licensing framework for enabling open access; rather
they rely on existing licensing platforms such as Creative Commons or let
the authors or the open-access repositories draft their own open-access
52. For the complete text of the Berlin declaration, see Berlin Declaration on Open Access to
Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities (Oct. 22, 2003), available at http://oa.mpg.de/openaccess-
berlinIberlindeclaration.pdf.
53. Open Access Follow-Up Conference, http://www.eprints.org/events/berlin3/outcomes.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2007), cited in Guibault, supra note 50.
54. For a well-developed list, see Chris Armbruster, Five Reasons to Promote Open Access and
Five Roads to Accomplish It in Social and Cultural Science 17-19 (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper,
Nov. 12, 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=846824.
55. See European Integration Online Papers, http://eiop.or.at/eiop (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
56. See Social Science Research Network Homepage, http://www.ssm.com (last visited Feb. 7,
2007).
57. See Forum: Qualitative Social Research, http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs/fqs-eng.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
58. See Scientific Electronic Library Online, http://www.scielo.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
59. See European Research Paper Archive, http://eiop.or.at/erpa (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
60. See Public Library of Science, http://www.plos.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
61. See BioMed Central: The Open Access Publisher, http://www.biomedcentral.com (last visited
Feb. 7, 2007).
62. See World Health Organization: Health InterNetwork Access to Research Initiative,
http://www.who.int/hinari/en (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
63. See Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture, http://www.agintemetwork.org/en (last
visited Feb. 7, 2007).
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policy. Therefore, virality is not a necessary feature of such models except
when open access is embedded in licenses that impose such a contamina-
tion, such as the Creative Commons Share Alike licenses.
Science Commons, 64 a recent project born in the sphere of the Crea-
tive Commons organization, purports to build the conditions for an open
and networked science.65 It has started to develop licensing tools adapted to
the field of science, but not only related to scientific journals and publica-
tions. Such licenses might include a copyleft mechanism attaching the
"open" feature to all improvements and modifications of the originally
licensed products.
B. Common Characteristics
Despite their diversity, whether in objectives or in form, open-access
initiatives present some common characteristics.
1. The Assertion of the Intellectual Property Right
The purpose of open access and the transmittal of open access to a
given work and its multiple byproducts is not to relinquish the work or
invention into the public domain or to make it unprotected by the law. On
the contrary, open-source licenses generally assert a copyright or patent
right in the object they govern. Putting works, inventions, or data into the
public domain or making them available with no restriction has been
thought to jeopardize the sustainability of public availability. For example,
releasing the results of the mapping of the genome-whether human, ani-
mal, or vegetal-has enabled many to patent applications of such genetic
data. Not claiming a patent right in an invention-putting it in the public
domain once published or divulged in any manner-does not prevent
someone who might improve the invention to claim a patent in the im-
provements.
The strategy chosen by the open-source movement is to leverage the
exclusive rights of copyrights or patents to guarantee and maintain the pub-
lic accessibility of works and inventions and of derivative creations. In
other words, commons-based initiatives "create a self-binding commons
rather than an unrestricted public domain. '" 66
64. See Science Commons, http://sciencecommons.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
65. See JOHN WILBANKS & JAMES BOYLE, INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE COMMONS (2006), avail-
able at http://www.sciencecommons.org/about/ScienceCommonsConceptPaper.pdf.
66. Kapczynski et al., supra note 40, at 1072.
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While there are a variety of projects and licenses purporting to pro-
mote the intellectual commons, some disparage that principle and relin-
quish any right in the intellectual resource-giving it to the public domain.
This is the case of early genetic databases whose public domain strategy
was deemed sufficient both on ethical grounds67 and as a defensive means
to block patents on the resource or data itself once divulged. In support of
this view, Creative Commons also offers a license through which an author
can abandon her rights and dedicate her work to the public domain (the so-
called Public Domain Dedication License). 68
In some cases there are no IP rights to assert under a license but only
the contractual right itself. Open-source software, Creative Commons, or
open access related to scientific publications all pertain to copyrighted
works. The situation is more complicated in open-source patenting when
licensing sometimes covers non-patented inventions or mere (genetic) data
or discoveries. For example, the HapMap license does not have a patented
invention as an object but only unpatented information. The database itself
is not protected due to the lack of an internationally recognized right in
non-original databases. The license does not authorize the use of the data
under the exercise of a patent but only grants the access to the database
under the material and defacto control of the project. 69 The BiOS licenses
cover patented inventions but also cover the know-how related to the re-
search tools. Such know-how is not protected by any intellectual property
right but by the contract only. The absence of legal protection in the objects
of those open-access licenses weakens the ground for licensing. This could
be consequently considered a pure private ordering method since it creates
a norm not relying on any legal entitlement conferred by public ordering.
This will also have some decisive consequences for the validity of the
norm-making process.
2. The Reverse Use of Exclusivity
Whereas traditional private ordering seeks to expand exclusivity be-
yond the limits of exclusive rights, commons-based private ordering
enlarges freedoms of users within that very exclusivity granted by the law.
An exclusive right is fundamentally a right to control the use of its object.
67. See Sulston, supra note 36, at 66.
68. See Creative Commons, Public Domain, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain
(last visited Feb. 7, 2007). In addition, the Creative Commons Founder's Copyright, by which an author
adopts a shorter term of fourteen years for the protection of her work, after which the work enters the
public domain. See Creative Commons, Founder's Copyright, http://creativecommons.org/ pro-
jects/founderscopyright (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
69. See GonzAlez, supra note 50, at 349-50.
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In copyright it is a right to authorize or prohibit the reproduction or public
communication of the work. A patent is a right to authorize or prohibit the
use of the patented invention. Open access lies in the exercise of the right
to authorize the use of the work or invention-a use that can be subject to
some conditions depending on the open-access license. The author or in-
ventor opting for an open-access scheme exercises her right not to exclude
but to grant freedom to use-a freedom that is sometimes limited to some
purposes or to which the obligation to grant the same freedom subsequently
is attached.
The exclusivity conferred by the intellectual property right is thus
conceived not as an exclusionary power but as a liberty or monopoly to
decide not to engage in exclusion. This is not paradoxical if one adheres to
the view that intellectual property is about exclusivity and not about exclu-
sion-the terms not being synonymous. Exclusivity is a power to exclude
but does not intrinsically lead to exclusion.
It is worthwhile to point out that copyleft licenses do go beyond the
mere use of the author's or inventor's own exclusive rights in line with the
arbitrary monopoly granted by copyright or patent laws. Through the viral
effect of such licenses, the first creator is likely to require subsequent users
to abide by the philosophy and principles of open access. Where free distri-
bution only concerns subsequent copies of the work or use of the patented
invention, the imposition of such freedom can be understood as justified by
the exclusive rights of that creator. But when the principle of free access
pertains to modified works or inventions based on that primary material,
the free licensing scheme constrains the exercise of the exclusive rights of
the subsequent creator.
Without going into too much detail on that issue, one could note that
this expanded exercise of exclusivity-inasmuch as it touches upon the
exclusivity of others-might raise problems in author's right countries
where the moral right of divulgation entitles the author to decide when and
how she wants to divulge her work. It also raises intricate issues when the
derivative work is a work made-for-hire for which the employer-and in
some countries the holder of the copyright in the work-might lose her
right to choose proprietary models of distribution for the sole reason that
her employees have included copylefted material in their own creation.
3. The Absence of Discrimination
Another trait of most open-access initiatives is the equal treatment of
any user who wants to use the copylefted asset. The granted freedom
should benefit all users whether individual, academic, or business-like and
20071
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should deploy whatever the context of use-whether the user is pursuing a
commercial purpose or not. Absence of discrimination is even one of the
mandatory requirements of the open-source licenses in software. 70
The principle of equal treatment as to the users or the type of use has
been qualified in some open-access schemes. Creative Commons licenses
provide a good example of differentiated treatment. One of the basic
choices that the author can make is to allow the freedom to use and copy
only for non-commercial purposes-allowing discrimination not against
the type of user but as to the purpose of use. 71 The absence of any defini-
tion of "non-commercial" in the CC license complicates the matter as there
is no certainty as to what types of use are permitted. 72
Licenses in favor of research and access to medicines for developing
countries, proposed by the scholars at the Yale Law School, 73 are another
example of discrimination within an open-access initiative. The objective
of such licenses is to ensure that the freedom is reserved for generic manu-
facturers or governments that want to supply developing countries in essen-
tial medicines. The Neglected Diseases License is reserved for researchers
or institutions carrying out research on such diseases. This privileged
treatment has the advantage of combining for the same invention a tradi-
tional market distribution and a commons-based one based on the distinc-
tion between industrialized and poorer countries and their specific needs
and means.
II. THE AMBIGUITY OF A NORM CAUGHT BETWEEN COLLECTIVIZATION
AND PRIVATE ORDERING
All open-access schemes purport to devise a new norm of sharing in
intellectual property. However, relying upon a private ordering tool, such
as the license, gives rise to a twofold paradox. On one hand, a collective
and public change in the exercise of intellectual property is surprisingly
pursued (and might be achieved) through purely private tools. On the other
hand, the use of private tools qualifies somewhat the collective norm that is
advocated and has equally surprising consequences on the sharing ethos at
stake. This is what this section will try to demonstrate. This ambiguity be-
tween the pursued socialization of intellectual resources and the privatiza-
tion that the use of licenses inherently induces is rooted both in the
70. Open Source Definition, supra note 23, para. 6.
71. See Choosing a License, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
72. See Creative Commons Legal Code, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ legal-
code (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
73. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 40, at 1035-36.
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ideology of sharing that the open-access movement advocates and in the
legal mechanism that enables private ordering to obtain an almost public
dimension-the copyleft mechanism.
A. The Ideological Norm of Sharing
Open access as a political objective ultimately aims at changing social
practices in copyright and patent laws. 74 Its proponents are generally ex-
ceedingly critical of the expansion of intellectual property, which they con-
sider to be overreaching and detrimental to the dissemination of culture,
information, and the development of science and innovation. The new
model they advocate for the exercise of intellectual property rights pro-
motes free access to and use of works and inventions, so as to transform
them into "commons," and to curtail copyright's and patent's overreaching
and what they perceive as an increasing enclosure of the public domain.
They offer "a model by which a network of independent but interconnected
participants can choose to act-not to change the legal system, but to
change their practices within it. ' '75
All open-access projects are backed up by an ideological manifesto.
Such manifestos are stronger in some projects such as in the GPL or Crea-
tive Commons licenses where the line between the use of copyright to
achieve a commons agenda and the struggle against copyright itself is not
always clear.76 Such an ideological ground is sometimes rejected by open-
access initiatives. One example is the foundation of the Open Source Initia-
tive, which explicitly wanted to dissociate itself from the anti-copyright and
anti-proprietary stance of Richard Stallman and the Free Software Founda-
tion.
This ideological dimension is not as present in private ordering
schemes that insist on expanding the intellectual property rights through
DRM-based distribution models or constraining licenses. This ideal, lined
with proselytism, is essential to deploying open-access schemes and con-
vincing the rights owners to adhere.
This ideological foundation could also produce some subversive ef-
fects on intellectual property. The open-access licenses reenact copyright or
patent laws in order to achieve another purpose. Exercising such exclusive
74. Milton Mueller, Info-communism? A Critique of the Emerging Discourse of the Property
Rights in Information, Address at Governance, Regulations, and Power on the Internet, Paris (May 27,
2005), transcript available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/403/lnfo-Communism-
Mueller.pdf.
75. Kapczynski et al., supra note 40, at 1068.
76. See Dusollier, supra note 13, at 278, 287.
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rights differently from what has become the usual, and almost normative,
way could succeed in proving the artificiality of the traditional discourse in
IP that tends to depict the remuneration-based or control-centered model as
the normal way of exercising copyright or patent rights. If that rhetoric is
revealed as merely one choice amongst others, the imperative of making
copyright or patent right an increasingly stronger instrument of control may
well be undermined, which could ultimately resignify the meaning of intel-
lectual property.
The development of the sharing norm that is promoted by commons-
based initiatives might be successful on two levels. The first level occurs in
the ways individual rights owners feel they have to exercise their rights. At
a higher level, the proliferation of such strategies might also change the law
itself by inducing lawmakers to conform the law to such practices. This
explains the twofold strategy that open-access promoters engage in. On the
one hand, they deploy practical tools to enable sharing and marketing
amongst creators and inventors. On the other hand, they lobby for legal
changes of the IP regime.
The inherent limitation and weakness of the construction of the alter-
native norm of sharing comes from the private ordering nature of the norm.
The socialization of the intellectual assets only occurs as a choice of rights
owners who should be convinced by the ethics of the open-source move-
ment. Therefore, it would be naYve to think that GPL, Creative Commons,
or other similar licenses might change the exclusion-based practice of Mi-
crosoft, RIAA, Disney, Elsevier, Monsanto, or Genentech. As opposed to
public ordering, open-access licensing does not bind all copyright or patent
rightholders. The subjects of the copyleft "law" are limited to those who
adhere to that specific model, the users of the works or inventions con-
cerned, and, through the viral effect, possibly the improvers of such crea-
tions. The traditional law obliges all physical and legal persons in a
territory. This shortcoming of the ideological construction of the open-
access movements results from the very use of private ordering tools.
Beyond the somewhat imperfect capacity to really constitute a norm
outside of the parties directly involved, private ordering has also a sym-
bolic meaning that should not be neglected. In a recent article, Niva Elkin-
Koren criticizes the recourse of the Creative Commons to private ordering
methods, using the following argument: Claiming property rights in crea-
tive works communicates a message that information is proprietary, that it
always has an owner. It strengthens the perception of informational works
as commodities which are subject to exclusive rights. It reinforces the per-
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ception that a license is always necessary, and that sharing is prohibited
unless authorized. 77
Her critique is valid for any open-access scheme based on licensing
contracts. The narrative of property rights-backed up by contract-entails
a logic of exclusion that seems to contradict the ideology of sharing that the
commons-based projects promote. Niva Elkin-Koren further explains that
the use of the licensing tool symbolically signals that reliance on contracts
is a valid strategy in intellectual property which therefore aids the cause of
private ordering for less innocuous purposes.
As I have written in another article dealing specifically with Creative
Commons, 78 one could be skeptical of a strategy that uses the same tools
and means of the regime it tries to dismantle. Relying on the private order-
ing scheme of property rights and licensing contracts installs a logic of
fencing in intellectual assets despite its intent to free such assets. This could
have unintended consequences on the message and ideology conveyed by
such commons-based initiatives.
That logic of exclusion explains the reluctance of the Human Genome
Project to abide by the open-source principle, which would contradict (in
their view) the inherent public nature of any information of the human
identity. As the Nobel Prize winner and director of the Human Genome
Project John Sulston said, "nobody has a right to control access to [our
common heritage]" whether by an exclusive patent right, by contract, or by
an access mechanism. 79
The commodification enabled by open-access contracts is especially
disturbing when such licensing is applied to items not protected by an intel-
lectual property right, which is the case for unpatented genetic information
or inventions that the inventor has decided not to patent, such as the infor-
mation contained in the HapMap database or the know-how licensed by
BiOS. In such a case, open-access strategy implies a form of exclusivity
where intellectual property regimes-as devised by public ordering-do
not apply.
One could argue that some form of exclusivity is precisely the purpose
of the open-access regimes compared to a policy of putting works, inven-
tions, or unprotected information into the public domain where further
commodification is not prohibited at all. In a way, it is a pragmatic way of
recognizing that the principle of the public domain does not work well to
77. See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facili-
tating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 398 (2005).
78. See Dusollier, supra note 13, at 282.
79. Sulston,supra note 36, at 71.
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ensure free availability of the resources contained therein, nor is it an effec-
tive buttress against their subsequent appropriation. 80
B. The Copyleft Mechanism as the Legal Engine of the Sharing Objective
The procedural nature of the norm built up by open-access initiatives
relies on the so-called copyleft or viral effect, which effectuates-by a
legal mechanism-the propagation ambition of the sharing ideology.
Whereas the ideology itself is propagated by convincing people to adhere
to its cause, the concrete working of the ideology is to construct a chain of
successive contracts imposing the sharing principle at each stage. The
copyleft effect enables the ideology of sharing to spill outside of the licens-
ing parties and contaminate subsequent creations. The copyleft provision
helps impose the sharing ethos to improvers of works or inventions, who
are sometimes deprived of the choice of other distribution models when
using open-source elements as building blocks of their own creation. The
only choice they retain pertains to the elements they can use as primary
material. A private company that does not want to adhere to the open-
source model for its own software might well be advised to prevent its
employees from integrating open-source elements in the construction of
such software.
Even the choice of the elements to be used in the subsequent creation
is not always possible. This is particularly true in the biotechnology sector
where the possibility of inventing around a prior invention is rather con-
strained. If access to information regarding a specific genetic sequence is
licensed under an open-access scheme and is not available elsewhere, the
scientists working on the operation of such gene will have no choice but to
redo the work of sequencing. 81 The mandatory character of the open-access
mechanism is thus inversely proportional to the substitutability of the mate-
rial governed by such licenses.
The viral nature of the open-source or open-access schemes is present
in many licenses. Each person in the chain of distribution of open-source
software-work licensed under a Creative Commons Share Alike or of data
hosted in the HapMap database-is bound to propagate any improvements
under the same licensing scheme. To make the virality of the open-source
or open-access system work, a necessary feature of such contracts is to
oblige the user to affix the license to such copies. The user then distributes
80. See Sverine Dusollier & Valrie-Laure Benabou, Draw Me A Public Domain, in COPYRIGHT
LAW: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (P. Torremans ed., forthcoming 2007).
81. If the information is not patented but its access is only protected by contract.
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copies of the work or improvements or modifications. As a consequence,
any subsequent user will encounter the license when she desires to use the
licensed material. As Margaret Radin has described this process, it is an
"attempt to make commitments run with a digital object. '82 In viral con-
tracts, the terms of the contract accompany the work or software that is
disseminated, 83 the contract runs with the digital asset, and the license is
embedded in the object it purports to regulate. It goes as far as running with
modified or improved versions of the work or software it primarily seeks to
rule. Therefore, the copyleft transforms a mere private ordering effect-
normally applicable only to the parties to the private ordering tool (i.e., the
contract)-into a feature applicable to the intellectual resource itself and to
any user thereof. The protection transforms from contract to what oddly
resembles a property right.
The contamination works in a slightly different way in open-source
patenting where the copyleft effect or the reciprocal sharing is ensured
through a mechanism of grant-back and not by a viral contract. 84 This dif-
ference can be explained by the nature of the resources governed by such
licenses. The assets in question are knowledge, data, or research tools that
are usually not commercialized or distributed as commodities-at least not
on a large scale-as software or music can be, but assets for which access
thereto forms the core of the licensing contract. Those are also not types of
assets which could be subject to mass-market licenses since they are aimed
at some specialists only. Therefore, it is more difficult to envision in that
case that the license would run with the asset. Rather than being depicted as
a viral phenomenon occurring in a long list of successive contracts, open-
source patenting-at least in the examples of the BIOS licenses or in the
proposals for an Equitable Access or Neglected Diseases License-is more
akin to the management of goods in a commons pool resource. Commons-
pool resources can be defined as "substractable resources managed under a
property regime in which a legally defined user pool cannot be efficiently
excluded from the resource domain. ' 85 Examples are the management of
Antarctica or of sea resources. The typical trait of such commons-pool
resources is that the bundle of rights to use such resources is collectively
82. Margaret Jane Radin, Human, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1132
(2000).
83. This is particularly true in Creative Commons where the process of creating the license whose
basic terms have been chosen by the author is completely automated and a digital code version of the
license is provided to be affixed to the work. The product of the license is offered with the product of
the work.
84. Or a reverse grant-back as preferred by Sara Boettiger and Dan L. Burk. See Boettiger &
Burk, supra note 16, at 228.
85. SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (1998).
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
enjoyed by defined users-members of the pool-who cannot be excluded
from the resource domain.8 6 As in the copyleft feature of open-access li-
censes, a commons pool resource generally includes a set of rights defining
access to and use of the resources, 87 and therefore also relies upon private
ordering. It differs from the virality in the sense that the obligation to share
is more strictly related to the persons entering the pool through their access
to the resource than being an inherent element of the resource that imposes
itself on any recipient of that resource. Yet, it has a similar effect because it
facilitates setting up reciprocal sharing and self-perpetuating commons.
The legal entitlement is also related to the good rather than strictly attached
to the contract and contractual parties.
C. The Efficiency of the Copyleft in Norm Making
The extent and success of such a procedural contamination, whether
by copyleft or grant-back mechanisms, requires that the chain of contracts
distributing copies of the work, invention and improvements, or derivative
works not be broken at some stage. Continuity enables the open-access
feature to smoothly propagate beyond the first contract. It will depend on
three factors: (1) the scope of the virality based on the definition of the
derivative products to be contaminated, (2) the legal validity of the copyleft
effect, and (3) the effective compatibility between the licenses.
1. The Scope of the Viral Effect
In open-access licenses that contain a copyleft effect, the contamina-
tion of the openness will normally apply to improvements or modifications
made to the object governed by such licenses. In other words, integrating
part of copyleft-licensed resource into a larger work or invention entails the
spreading of this license to the whole. How small the integrated part should
be to trigger this contamination is a question on which will depend the
effectiveness of the viral mechanism to impose the norm of sharing beyond
the strict limits of the first contract.
A key issue is to define the subsequent or derivative products that will
be subject to the open-access principle. It seems reasonable to look to the
interpretation of such notions in copyright or patent laws. Copyright laws
sometimes define "derivative work." For instance, § 101 of the U.S. Copy-
right Code states that a derivative work is "a work based upon one or more
86. Id.
87. See Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A
Conceptual Analysis, 68 LAND ECON. 249, 250 (1992).
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preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatiza-
tion, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduc-
tion, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted, '' 88 including works consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications when such
modifications are sufficient to create a new original work. In contrast, the
French Code of Intellectual Property defines a derivative work, or "com-
posite work," ("oeuvre composite") as "a new work in which a preexisting
work is incorporated without the collaboration of the author of the latter. '89
This definition is also valid in other authors'-rights countries. The
definition indicates that there is a derivative work as soon as any copy-
righted (i.e., formal and original) aspect of the primary work is inte-
grated-modified or not-into a new creation that should itself be
copyrightable. In copyright the author of the primary work enjoys the right
to control the making of derivative works based on her own creations since
such a derivative creation is a reproduction of her work. This constitutes
the justification of the copyleft effect: the primary author can impose a free
distribution of the derivative work only as a condition on the secondary
author's right to carry out such derivative work in the first place.
So justified, the copyleft should logically reach only the works that
can be qualified as derivative under the copyright law. However, the matter
is sometimes more intricate. The problem notably arose in open-source
software and particularly in the GNU General Public License ("GPL"). The
GPL is deemed to embed a rather extended copyleft principle. In its version
2.0., currently in use, the GPL states that any work "that in whole or in part
contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof [shall] be li-
censed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this
License." 90 On the face of it, this language seems consistent with the defi-
nition of a derivative work under copyright law to which the definitional
section of the license refers. Modifications of the code of a GNU GPL-
licensed program or integration of such code into other software would
definitely be considered derivative works subject to the copyleft provision.
Yet, according to some commentators, the GNU GPL will also apply to the
software that merely links to a GNU GPL-protected element such as a
plug-in, a library, or any other routine. Libraries are a sort of toolbox for
88. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 2004).
89. Law No. 96-564 of July 25, 1996, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], Dec. 26, 1996, translation available at http://195.83.177.9/code/
liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=36&r=2495.
90. GNU General Public License Version 2 (June 1991), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.txt (last
visited Feb. 13, 2007).
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software. They are subprograms that provide code or data to software in
order to perform certain tasks. Data contained in libraries are usually not
copied in the main software but remain in a separate file on disk and are
called upon when needed through a process called dynamic linking. The
Free Software Foundation (the think tank of the GPL) assumes that even a
program that merely links with a GPL-ed program is derived from the pro-
gram and must therefore be licensed under the GPL in order to comply with
its terms and conditions. 91 This is confirmed on their website where they
recommend the use of a lesser copylefted license, the LGPL (more adapted
to libraries), precisely to avoid this contamination through linking.92
One can reasonably doubt such an extensive expansion. 93 Theoreti-
cally, a dynamic linkage between two programs is only an incidental con-
tact and does not amount to a modification or integration of the code.
Hence, it does not constitute a derivative work under copyright law. The
only reproduction of code that is made through dynamic linking occurs in
the RAM of the computer where both programs are "merged." But this
incidental reproduction does not suffice to form a derivative work, namely
because of a lack of fixation.
The notion of derivative works to which the share-alike principle ap-
plies in homonymous Creative Commons licenses simply refers to the defi-
nition appearing in the U.S. Copyright Act. Consequently, this notion
should be construed with reference to the case law applying the notion of a
derivative work, which could raise additional problems when different laws
are applied.
The issue might be even more complicated in open-source patenting
since there is no similar concept of a derivative work. Indeed, the holder of
a dominant patent cannot prohibit or control the making of improvements
to her invention. She can only exercise her patent if the primary invention
she holds rights to is used in the invention process and/or in the commer-
cialization of the improved product, which will not be always the case. 94
Even if the primary invention is used in the improvement, the improver
can, in some countries, get the right to use the dominant invention through
91. Richard Stallman, Why You Should Not Use the Library GPL for Your Next Library,
http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/why-not-lgpl.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
92. Id.
93. For a thorough analysis of this issue, see Philippe Laurent, Logiciels Llibres et Droit
D'auteur: Naissance, Titularit et Exercice des Droits Patrimoniaux, in LES LOGICIELS LIBRES FACE
AU DROIT 77-86 (2005); see also LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 115 (2005), available at http://www.rosenlaw.com/oslbook.htm; Jason
B. Washa, Open source, Free Software, and the General Public License, COMPUTER & INTERNET
LAW., Mar. 2003, at 20, 22.
94. Boettiger & Burk, supra note 16, at 226-27.
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a compulsory license on some conditions. This demonstrates that patent
law deviates from the expansionist logic of the derivative works in copy-
right law. This suggests that the copyleft device embedded in open-source
patent licenses does not actually rely on an exclusive right but is closer to a
contractual restriction.95 This is even more true for licenses applicable to
unpatented information or inventions, such as the HapMap licenses.
This might explain why, in the existing proposals or licenses for open-
source patenting, the copyleft effect is replaced by a softer version, i.e., the
grant-back mechanism. As noted earlier, instead of setting up a contamina-
tion process-whose justification is weaker in the patent field-the grant-
back mechanism avoids the debate by organizing a commons-pool regime
gathering all users (and possible improvers) of the invention.
Whether based on a strict copyleft method or on a grant-back system,
the notion of improvements could be defined in the contract to determine
what triggers the grant-back or copyleft obligation.96 If the license covers a
patented invention, improvements can also be determined by looking at the
patent claims concerned. The BiOS license defines the improvements sub-
ject to its grant-back provisions as
any improvement to the IP & Technology made or discovered by or for
BiOS LICENSEE or any party to which BiOS LICENSEE has granted a
sublicense, comprising-without limitation-methods, compositions,
know-how, statistically significant or repeatable observations, or proto-
cols, which (1) is a Plant Enabling Technology improving or increasing
the effectiveness, efficiency, applicability, or value of the IP & Technol-
ogy from which it is derived, or (2) but for the terms of this License
Agreement cannot be used without infringing a valid claim in an unex-
pired Licensed Patent, unless (1) developed without any use of the IP &
Technology, or (2) existing as of the Effective Date of this Agreement or
any specifically related Materials Transfer and Non-Disclosure Agree-
ment, whichever is earlier, or (3) not relevant to the general use of the IP
& Technology as a Plant Enabling Technology and relevant or applicable
solely for production or use of a BiOS Licensed Product, or (4) consist-
ing entirely of a confidential formula, pattern, process device, informa-
tion, or compilation of information that is actively maintained as a
proprietary trade secret for use in BiOS LICENSEE's business by obli-
gation of confidentiality and by other reasonable efforts of BiOS
LICENSEE such as would be defined as suppression or concealment im-
posing a statutory bar against patenting by the United States Patent Of-
fice. 97
95. Opderbeck, supra note 13, at 200.
96. See also Boettiger & Burk, supra note 16, at 227-28 (recommending distinguishing patent
improvements and separate application technologies that should not be encompassed by the grant-back
mechanism).
97. CAMBIA BiOS License for Plant Enabling Technology, § 1.7, http://www.cambia.org/daisy/
PELicense/751/1169.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
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This is a rather complicated and unclear definition that does not help much
to ascertain the scope of the grant-back mechanism and the scope of the
sharing norm. Improvements are said to include unpatented assets such as
methods or know-how, which is a significant departure from the scope of a
possible infringement of the patented invention primarily licensed under
BiOS's terms. However, the definition endeavors to stay in line with what
could be considered as a patent infringement.
The same provision adds that the licensee can also decide to consider
as an improvement any other invention that she wishes to share under the
BiOS pool. Here, the viral effect comes into play without any reference to
an improvement of the patent but solely as a result of the will of the licen-
see, which triggers the application of the "patent-left" regime to a new
object independent from the licensed patent. The contamination in that case
happens by mere ideology.
The HapMap license deals with genetic information (the haplotypes)
not likely to be protected by copyright and not likely to be patented since
they are publicly divulged. Based on a copyleft principle, the license re-
quires that the open-access principle apply to the further distribution of the
data and to any claim in a use of the information contained in the HapMap
database. But this copyleft obligation cannot rest upon the notion of deriva-
tive works or improvements to an existing patent. In contrast, it relies upon
the sole contractual obligation, making it a pure private ordering process.
As a brief conclusion on that point, one could reiterate that the ambit
of the copyleft contamination will thus depend on the definition-both
legal and contractual--of the derivative works and of patent improvements.
Where the open-access license deviates from the legal definition, its legal
ground for extension beyond the mere contract is solely based on private
ordering. The "public" character that the copyleft will gain as a norm will
only be valid when self-perpetuation takes place within the powers granted
by copyright or patent laws in modifications of the work or invention.
2. The Legal Enforceability of the Viral Effect
Open-source licensing can propagate along a chain of successive con-
tracts only if each contract is enforceable against its parties. 98 For example,
let's suppose that A licenses the software she created under a GPL license.
B gets access to the software and distributes copies under the GPL. C gets
access to those subsequent copies. C modifies the software and distributes
98. See Andr~s Guadamuz Gonzflez, Viral Contracts or Unenforceable Documents? Contractual
Validity of Copyleft Licences, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 331 (2004).
[Vol 82:3
SHARING ACCESS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
the derivative software under a proprietary scheme and does not provide
access to the source code. In order for the obligation to offer the source
code to be imposed on C, C must be a party to the GPL license. When the
software is redistributed many times, that chain of successive contracts,
each link of which has to be legally ascertained, becomes even more com-
plex.
The architecture put in place in most open-access licenses, at least in
open-source software and Creative Commons, is not based on sublicensing
but on a more intricate system. The licensor (A in the example mentioned
above) grants to any licensee (B) the right to copy and distribute the work
to third parties and requests that a copy of the license accompany the copy
of the work. But the contract conferring the same rights to any new user of
the work (third party to the first contract or Q is entered with the first li-
censor or author of the work (A), not with the licensee who stands earlier in
the chain of distribution. When the work is modified, the licensee is
obliged to confer a similar license to subsequent users but only as to her
modifications-the primary work remains governed by the first license. To
summarize, a threefold operation occurs when redistributing a work or
software licensed under a copyleft scheme. The licensee, B, transfers a
material copy of the program to C who receives a license from A, the origi-
nal author of the program, and a license from B for the possible modifica-
tions. C can be legally bound by the open-access contractual system if the
contract entered with A as well as the contract entered with B, if a deriva-
tive work is concerned, are enforceable against her. Two (or even more
depending on the length of the chain of distribution and modification of the
work) contracts are thus relevant even though the question of their enforce-
ability against the user of the work can be stated in the same terms.99 The
copyleft mechanism makes things simpler by imposing the provision of the
license with the software, when redistributed, and by requiring that any
modification be governed by the same license.
Some commentators solve the issue of enforceability by arguing that
the open-source license is not a contract but a unilateral act of consent by
the right owner. Such an analysis might be valid as far as the provisions
granting rights of use to the user are concerned. Indeed, because such pro-
visions only cover the exercise of the exclusive right of copyright or patent,
99. 1 leave aside the interesting question as to whether C can sue B for not providing the source
code to her, where the sole contract imposing such a provision is entered between A and B. That ques-
tion can be addressed by reference to the concepts of privity under common law or to that of stipulation
pour autrui in civil law countries. See id. at 336; Yorick Cool, Aspects Contractuels des Licences de
Logiciels Libres: Les Obligations de la Libert , in LES LOGICIELS LIBRES FACE Au DROIT, supra note
93, at 155.
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they do not require the consent of the user. This explains section 9(5) of the
GPL (in its draft version 3), which provides that "you are not required to
accept this License in order to receive or run a copy of the Pro-
gram.... However, nothing else grants you permission to propagate or
modify the Program or any covered works."'100 Such a provision explains
how the open-source model conceives the enforceability of its licenses-by
relying upon the copyright protection. It is true that lacking the acceptance
of the license, the copy or distribution of the software amounts to an in-
fringement. Users of copylefted works should thus be encouraged to accept
the license to fully enjoy the freedoms conferred therein.
However, the enforcement of the license cannot solely rely on the erga
omnes opposability of the intellectual property rights. Some obligations or
rights arising from the open-access license do not rely at all on a copyright
or patent right. This is true in the case of the no-warranty clause or provi-
sions dealing with the termination of the contract. For such provisions, the
contract has to be enforceable against licensees. Limiting the warranty of
the user, especially where she is a consumer protected by legal mandatory
provisions-as is the case in the European Union-cannot result from a
mere unilateral act. Similarly, the validity of the unilaterally imposed obli-
gations on a third party, such as the obligation to provide the source code,
is rather dubious.
Besides, the enforceability of the license is particularly crucial when
its object is not protected by an intellectual property right, such as the li-
censes governing some genetic databases. The rights and obligations are in
that case completely dependent on the existence and validity of the con-
tract. Rules of consent or privity will thus apply to determine whether the
license has been accepted and is enforceable.
The enforceability of open-source licenses is somewhat uncertain
when the use or distribution of'the licensed object is deemed to constitute
acceptance of the license, such as in the case of the Creative Commons
licenses' 0 1 or in the GPL. 102 This acceptance system is close to that of
shrinkwrap licenses whose enforceability has only been implicitly recog-
100. Discussion Draft 2 of Version 3 of GNU General Public License § 9(5) (July 27, 2006),
http://gplv3.fsf.org/gpl-draft-2006-07-27.txt (last visited Feb. 12, 2007). A similar provision appeared
in the HapMap License which is copied verbatim from the GPL.
101. The Preamble of the Creative Commons License provides that "by exercising any rights to the
work provided here, you accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this license. The licensor grants
you the rights contained here in consideration of your acceptance of such terms and conditions." Crea-
tive Commons Legal Code, supra note 72.
102. Section 9(5) of the GPL (draft version 3) says that "by modifying or propagating the Program
(or any covered work), you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so, and all its terms and
conditions." Discussion Draft 2 of Version 3 of GNU General Public License, supra note 100, § 9(5).
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nized by some case law. In civil law countries, the acceptance of terms and
conditions can only be based on the certainty (1) that the licensee had the
opportunity to read these terms and conditions and (2) that she agreed with
the latter. The mere fact of using the licensed object, modifying it, or dis-
tributing it does not mean that the user is aware of all the terms and condi-
tions and has accepted them. When access to the covered work is
dependent on the acceptance of the contract-by a click-wrap process (like
in the case of the HapMap license where assent to the contract by a click-
mouse was a required step before entering the databaselO3)-consent to the
license might be more easily proved. In other cases, one can infer a tacit
acceptance of the license from the fact of using, modifying, and distributing
the work subject to the license in some circumstances, particularly if one
can prove that the licensee has had the opportunity to become aware of the
license's terms. However, this must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The BiOS licenses avoid this criticism by requiring the signed agreement of
the licensees to the contract. 104
Consequently, the contractual system put in place in open-access
schemes does not necessarily ascertain the consent to the successive li-
censes, even though open-source and copyleft licenses have been enforced
by some courts. One German court has applied the GPL license, 105 affirm-
ing that the terms and conditions of the GPL were part of the contract-as
general terms and conditions would be-by the simple fact that a reference
was made to a publicly available web page.
In the Netherlands, the proviso of the Creative Commons stating that
the exercise of rights to the work entails the acceptance of the license has
been held valid, particularly due to the fact that the infringer was a profes-
sional who should have checked the terms of the license.106 Reproducing a
picture licensed under a Non-Commercial License in a commercial news-
paper was therefore considered to be an infringement of the copyright and a
breach of the contract itself.
Both decisions dealt only with the existence of an infringement of the
rights of the author when reproducing the work without complying with the
conditions of the license. To my knowledge, there has never been a case
where a provision of the license, not relying on the intellectual property
103. See HapMap Data Access Policy, supra note 37.
104. See CAMBIA BiOS License for Plant Enabling Technology, supra note 97.
105. Landgericht Miinchen I [LG] [Munich District Court], May 19, 2004, No. 21 0 6123/04,
translation available at http://www.jbb.de/judgment-dc-munich-gpi.pdf.
106. Curry/Audax, Kort Geding [KG], [District Court], Amsterdam, Mar. 9, 2006, available at
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl, translation available at http://mirrors.creativecommons.org/judgements/
Curry-Audax-English.pdf.
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right at all, was the subject of the litigation. They were also very simple
cases where the license at stake was directly entered into with the author of
the primary work, thus not very far down the chain of successive contracts
that could apply to multiple subsequent modified works.
Due to the uncertain enforceability of the license, the freedom con-
ferred by the license is not as solid as a limitation of copyright or patent
right. This is directly linked to the nature of the norm imposed through
private ordering. But it goes even further since the model put in place by
some open-access licenses to compel their enforceability is likely to rein-
force a disturbing feature of the private ordering process. Indeed, the use-
as-assent rule was first used in the distribution of proprietary software
through shrink-wrap contracts. The similarity of the models put in place in
the proprietary exercise of IP and in open-access regimes should beg the
question as to whether the contractual trick of open-access licenses would
not "equally make enforceable corporate licensing practices, which over-
ride users' privileges under copyright law." 107
Already in the context of the open-source movement, the software in-
dustry, despite its apparent animosity to open source, was happy to witness
the enforcement of the viral character of contract (particularly the provision
that says that each use of the software amounts to a consent to the license
terms), 108 because it also uses viral contracts in its proprietary distribution
of software and hoped that the enforceability of such an excessive rule
would be recognized by the courts. Open-source software employs the very
mechanism that made the distribution of software so pervasive (namely, the
immediate application of a license as soon as the computer program has
been used). By attempting to bind whoever comes into possession of the
commodity, it enables the sale of a product or a service while simultane-
ously binding a user under terms of use, whether constraining (in proprie-
tary licenses) or generous (in open-access licenses).
The use of viral contracts further enhances commodification by attach-
ing the contract to the product in an indissociable way. This is a new area
of contract law that has been implemented in adhesion contracts, "click-
wrap" contracts, "machine-made" contracts, and "viral contracts."1 09 In
viral contracts the terms of the contract accompany the work, invention, or
software that is disseminated. The contract runs with the digital asset and
the license is embedded in the object it purports to regulate. This is particu-
107. Elkin-Koren, supra note 77, at 417.
108. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open
Source Software Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B, 36 Hous. L. REV. 179 (1999).
109. Radin, supra note 82, at 1128-33.
[Vol 82:3
SHARING ACCESS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
larly true in Creative Commons where the process of creating the license,
whose basic terms have been chosen by the author, is completely auto-
mated and a digital code version of the license is provided to be affixed to
the work. The product of the license is offered with the product of the
work. 1 10
The contract-as-product view makes the contractual rights closer to
property rights to the extent that this model eludes the consent of the con-
tracting party. The contractual rights almost become rights against the
world. It also increases the commodification of intellectual resources, as
any copy is governed by predetermined terms that apply to any use of the
work or invention. Paradoxically, this is precisely the growing commodifi-
cation of intellectual property that the open-access movement seeks to
fight.
3. The Effective Compatibility Between the Licenses
Law uniformly applies to any object it governs. That is not always the
case with open-access licenses, where accidents of propagation can occur
and disrupt the propagation course. This is a result of the multiplicity of
existing open-access licenses and to an additional obstacle to the copyleft
effect-compatibility between the licenses. That is a major drawback of
copyleft licenses that has been so far underestimated by their proponents.
The issue is the following: Imagine that one programmer creates software
by integrating one piece of code licensed under the GPL and another one
distributed under another open-source license. Each license requires the
modifications to be distributed under the same terms covering the original
work. What license will apply to the derivative work in our case? Opting
for one license will necessarily infringe the terms of the other one. The user
wanting to comply with the licenses she entered into will be faced with an
unsolvable dilemma. The same problem can occur with works distributed
under different open-access licenses or even under different Creative
Commons licenses. The problem can also occur with data or patented in-
ventions under an open-source patenting scheme-such as improvements
based on two different inventions-governed by separate licenses.
Compatibility is usually not regulated by the license itself, save for the
GPL, which declares that some licenses are compatible with the GPL. This
declared compatibility means in reality that the Free Software Foundation
believes that the GPL can cover the derivative software based on code li-
110. See Creative Commons, Metadata Embedding, http://creativecommons.org/technology/ em-
bedding (last visited Mar. 31, 2006); Creative Commons, Using Creative Commons Metadata,
http://creativecommons.org/technology/usingmarkup (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
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censed under such licenses (also called upstream compatibility). Con-
versely, the GPL will apply to software integrating a piece of GPL-licensed
code, whether or not this piece is minimal compared to other components
licensed under other schemes (downstream compatibility). In its (draft)
version 3, the GPL license indicates that the Free Software Foundation
might authorize a licensee to incorporate parts of a GPL-ed program into
other free programs under licenses other than the GPL, upon request."'
However, one might fear that the FSF does not grant such an authorization
easily.
The same problem can arise with Creative Commons licenses where
the diversity of licenses is also increased by the choice between different
features or jurisdictions. A piece of music can be composed by using two
existing pieces--one governed by a CC Attribution Non-Commercial Share
Alike license; the other by a CC Attribution Share Alike. In order to com-
ply with her obligations under the CC licenses applying to the music she
used as primary material, the derivative composer has to license the deriva-
tive work under a CC Attribution Non-Commercial Share Alike license
which represents the common denominator between both licenses. The
problem is thus less intricate than with open-source software, primarily
because the compatibility issue arises between similar licenses originating
from the same project. However, that signifies that the model chosen by the
author of the second piece of music, allowing for commercial and non-
commercial purposes alike, is now reduced to non-commercial purposes. It
also theoretically infringes article 4(b) of the Share Alike license that binds
the licensee not to offer any terms on the derivative works that alter the
term of the license. Musical works can also integrate parts of music li-
censed under other open-access licenses that are not Creative Commons.
Due to the relative scarcity of open-source licenses in patent law, is-
sues of compatibility between different licenses as applied to possible im-
provements of two different inventions or to combined applications of
different data have not arisen yet but are bound to happen. As in the case of
open-source software, the propagation of the chosen license would then be
stopped and replaced by another license. From a normative point of view,
that greatly decreases the ambition of commons-based private ordering to
evenly proliferate along the multiple uses of the intellectual creation to
which it applies. This is one of the biggest and still unknown weaknesses of
the open-access normative model-that is intrinsically dependent on its
private ordering nature.
I ll. See Discussion Draft 2 of Version 3 of GNU General Public License, supra note 100,
§ 15(10).
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The issue of compatibility also proves that the approach might be very
fragmented-not as global as a public ordering process might be. There-
fore, there might be no legal certainty as to the limits of entitlements and
freedoms granted by the license, which also reduces the effectiveness of the
open-access norm.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE OPEN-ACCESS NORM
Open-access initiatives mainly originate in industrialized countries.
They are not primarily aimed at socializing the access to intellectual prop-
erty in favor of developing countries, save for the specific Developing
Countries License in Creative Commons or the propositions of the team of
scholars led by Yochai Benkler to address health issues in poorer coun-
tries.' 12 Nonetheless, if one recognizes that a key concern of developing
countries is to get enhanced access to intellectual resources and to fight the
increasing commodification of intellectual assets (that operates generally to
the sole profit of the western countries), open access could provide them
with an interesting lead. That would require that the licenses and tools de-
ployed by all those commons-based initiatives be adapted to their specific
situations.
Because this article is limited to an analysis of the validity of the
open-access scheme as a norm and not as to its content and objective, the
adaptability of the licenses to developing countries shall be judged only on
its capability to be compliant with any national normative and legal frame-
work. It can also carry out such an analysis only on an abstract level, not as
to the peculiar situation and regulatory frameworks of developing coun-
tries. In addressing the global propensity of the open-access licenses, only
some licensing frames will be assessed.
A. Open-Source Software
Open-source software is rooted in the United States and most of its li-
censes are based on U.S. law. The licenses are expressed in an American
style and vocabulary and refer to U.S. legal notions. This is particularly
apparent where the licenses define the rights granted to the user and the
type of damages for which the licensor declines any liability. As to the
rights granted to the licensees, they fit within U.S. legal categories of rights
as defined by the Copyright Act and refer to acts of exploitation that could
receive another appellation in other countries. For instance, the American
112. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 40.
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notion of "distribution" encompasses the diffusion of copies through the
web, whereas the European (and WIPO for that matter) distribution right
concerns only the distribution of tangible copies of the program, such as
CDs, disks, etc. In Europe and other countries, the notion of communica-
tion to the public includes the right to publicly perform or to diffuse works
through the air or networks (TV and radio diffusion; diffusion through the
Internet) whereas American law distinguishes the right to perform the work
from the right to display the work to the public, neither of which encom-
passes the right to distribute copies of the work through the Internet.
The GPL license only grants the rights to copy, modify, and distribute
the program and expressly excludes any other copyrights. 113 A European
judge construing this license with a strict European point of view and ap-
plying European law might therefore conclude that it excludes the right to
offer the program throughout the web. Conversely, one could argue that the
ongoing reference to U.S. legal notions does not threaten the validity of the
licenses. This legal uncertainty could be solved by the judge by referring to
common practices or usage in the open-source community so as to include
communication to the public in the orbit of licensed rights. This interpre-
tive method could be, in some countries, at odds with the principle of strict
interpretation of copyright contracts.
It is not only a matter of U.S. terminology. Licenses are deemed to be
compatible with the U.S. law but their compliance with other legal regimes
has not been assessed. The provisions dealing with the acceptance of the
contract, with the limitation of liability and warranty, or with the possible
applicability of a new version of the license, can raise legal issues in some
countries, particularly when the licensee is a consumer.1 14 Besides, most of
those licenses provide that the applicable law is the U.S. law and that any
litigation shall be brought in a U.S. jurisdiction. 115
Open-source licenses are also generally written in English and their
proponents tend to control very strictly translation of the licenses into a
different language. For instance, the Free Software Foundation has to vali-
1]3. See GNU General Public License Version 2, supra note 90 ("Activities other than copying,
distribution and modification are not covered by this License; they are outside its scope.").
114. This point is elaborated upon in a survey carried out for the European Commission on the
compatibility of some open-source licenses with the EU regulatory framework. See EUR. COMM'N,
REPORT ON OPEN SOURCE LICENSING OF SOFTWARE DEVELOPED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=19296. The study was carried out by
Unisys for the economic aspects and by the University of Namur (Center for Research in Computer
Law ("CRID")) for the legal aspects.
115. For example, see the Mozilla Public License which states that it will be governed by Califor-
nia law. Mozilla Public License Version 1.1, § 1I, http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/MPL-l.l.html (last
visisted Feb. 13, 2007).
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date any non-English version of the GPL, which it has never done so far-
the translated versions appearing on their websites having no official value.
There seems to be no desire in the open-source community to nationalize
the open-source process and licenses, probably because the open-source
community is viewed as naturally international and English speaking but
equally due to the fear of incompatibility between national versions. Soft-
ware code is distributed and copied on a cross-border scale, especially in
the free software community, and such an incompatibility could be a seri-
ous issue.
This association with U.S. law nonetheless explains some attempts to
devise new open-source licensing systems based on other legal frame-
works. For instance, some have proposed a French version of the GPL li-
cense. Elaborated by the CEA (Commissariat d l'energie atomique), the
CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), and INRIA (Institut
National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique), the so-called
CeCiLL license claims to be a translation of the GPL, though adapted to
the French laws. 116 They have asked the Free Software Foundation to offi-
cially acknowledge the CeCiLL license as a valid equivalent of the GPL,
but it has been refused so far.
In 2004, after having assessed the possibility of adopting existing li-
censes,117 the European Commission took a first step towards the elabora-
tion of a European open-source license. It started when the DG Enterprises,
which had developed software dedicated to management of public admini-
strations, decided to ensure the distribution of this software under an open-
source license. Even though the compliance of existing licenses with the
EU law was not insurmountable, the national dimension of the license to be
chosen was important for two reasons. First, the European Commission
could not use a license that might not be enforceable on European soil and
in front of the European courts. Second, because the target audience was
public administrations, there were great expectations that the license gov-
erning the software they would use for public service tasks would be com-
pliant with their national framework.
As a result, the European Public License (EUPL) was developed and
is now applied to that specific software dedicated to the management of
116. See CeCILL, http://www.cecill.fr/index.en.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
117. See EUR. COMM'N, supra note 114. Only five licenses, amongst the hundreds of existing
open-source licenses, were considered by the study: the GPL (General Public License v.2) and its LGPL
variant; the BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution-1998); the MPL (Mozilla Public License v.1.1); the
OSL (Open Software License v.2.1); and the French CeCILL mentioned above.
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public administrations."l 8 The European Commission does not reject the
possibility of applying it to other software or even of recommending it to
the European software community for the software they developed. How-
ever, there is still a long way to go before the EUPL would be the official
European standard open-source license.
In its current version, the EUPL contains some specific EU-centered
provisions (particularly its jurisdiction and choice of law provisions) and
thus replicates the approach of country-based specificity found in the GPL
or other open-source licenses.' 19 Nevertheless, the license has been written
as much as possible in light of an international copyright framework-the
rights covered by the license include rights phrased not only in EU termi-
nology, but refer broadly to the right to reproduce, communicate, and dis-
tribute, as defined by the WIPO treaties. The EUPL also deals with the
compatibility issue mentioned above, by providing that the further distribu-
tion of derivative works based upon a EUPL-licensed software is allowed
under another open-source license, if deemed compatible, and the agree-
ment refers to an annexed list of licenses meeting this requirement. 120 Con-
sequently, due to this lack of ambition from the European license to
colonize any derivative product based on EUPLed software, the copyleft
effect of the license might be reduced, depending on the open-source li-
censes incorporated in that list.
To conclude the discussion of the international dimension of open-
source software licenses, it is worthwhile to note that the Free Software
Foundation, aware of the issue and criticism, has devised a new version of
the GPL that tends to be less U.S.-centered. Primarily, the rights granted by
the license have lost their legal wrapping and now refer merely to pro-
gramming terms. The rights in the license revolve around two basic
rights-the right to propagate and the right to convey-as defined by arti-
cle 0 of the draft license:
To "propagate" a work means doing anything with it that requires per-
mission under applicable copyright law, except executing it on a com-
puter, or making modifications that you do not share. Propagation
includes copying, distribution (with or without modification), making
available to the public, and in some countries other activities as well. To
"convey" a work means any kind of propagation that enables other par-
ties to make or receive copies, excluding sublicensing. 121
118. See European Union Public Licence VO.2, http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Docid=24720
(last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
119. Id. art 14-15.
120. Id. art. 5.
121. Discussion Draft 2 of Version 3 of GNU General Public License, supra note 100, art. 0.
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This new version also prohibits adding to the license terms, choice of
law, forum, and venue clauses.
B. Creative Commons
Even though the project originated in the United States, Creative
Commons has tried early on to adapt its licensing system to other nations'
regulatory frameworks. For that purpose, the organization has launched the
iCommons project and asked national teams to translate the licenses into
their languages and legal systems. Works can now be licensed under Crea-
tive Commons licenses that are customized to the laws and languages of
more than thirty countries, a third of which are developing ones. 122 Since
the Creative Commons team monitors and checks the translation of licenses
into national laws, all of these licenses are designed to be compatible both
with the generic licenses and with each other, and to give the same rights
and obligations to the parties. Compared to most open-source licenses, the
Creative Commons licenses are probably more easily accepted by authors
and users, because they can understand the licenses' language and can rely
on the licenses' compliance with their national law.
This national splitting and the ensuing intricate grid of multiple li-
censes have some consequences on the development of the open-access
norm by giving birth to a paradoxical relationship between a homogeniza-
tion objective and the need for each national license to comply with and
take into account national regulations. As the process of translation of the
licenses into national laws has shown, local peculiarities of the copyright
regime can sometimes require an adaptation to the licenses that would dis-
rupt their worldwide similarity. National licenses mainly differ from the
generic one on the two following points: moral rights have sometimes been
included in countries that recognize such a right; 123 and in some European
countries, the object of the license has been modified in order to include
related rights or the sui generis right in a database.
Sometimes, for the sake of the interoperability and synchronization
between licenses, the Creative Commons team has decided not to adapt the
license but to envisage the problem raised in one jurisdiction in the future
revision of the generic license itself. For instance, the difficulty of licensing
122. Creative Commons, Worldwide, http://creativecommons.org/worldwide (last visited Feb. 13,
2007).
123. This point mainly concerns the right of integrity since all licenses impose the attribution of the
work to its author. Since some licenses allow for the modification of the work, it touches upon the
integrity right and could raise difficulties in countries where such right cannot be waived or even li-
censed.
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moral rights in some jurisdictions is an issue that was taken into considera-
tion when drafting version 3.0 of the licenses. At other times, a minor revi-
sion of the license has been permitted to make the license comply with the
regulatory framework of one jurisdiction, even though the revision made
that license slightly different from the generic one, in letter if not in spirit.
In some cases, therefore, opting for a national adaptation of the licenses
requires a choice between cross-border legal compliance, including global
similarity between national versions, and national legal compliance leading
to a dissimilarity between the different national CC licenses.
In addition, this possible (or inevitable?) national disparity amongst li-
censes, produced by this process of national adaptation, intensifies the issue
of compatibility between different open-access licenses addressed earlier.
The Creative Commons licenses provide that one can license a derivative
work under a similar license specific to another jurisdiction.124 Therefore, a
new work integrating other works licensed under, for example, Japanese,
Belgian, and U.K. Attribution Share Alike licenses does not have to be
licensed under a determined jurisdiction-based license so long as it is an
Attribution Share Alike one. But perfect compatibility will only be
achieved in that case if the Japanese, Belgian, U.K., or any other country
license chosen by the derivative creator are identical, which is difficult to
ascertain.
Another sign of the desire of Creative Commons not to appear to be
exceedingly U.S.-centric is the recent realization that the generic version of
the licenses-the version applied if no country is specifically chosen by the
author of the work-was designed according to U.S. copyright law. The
"generic" appellation of the homonymous license might induce the public
to assume that such a license encompasses all the other jurisdiction-specific
ones. Such a (pretended) generic license being the basis for the adaptation
of national versions, it has also shaped the global licensing scheme in a
particular way.
In reaction, the Creative Commons team is currently trying to write a
genuine and stateless generic license that could be considered compliant
with the international copyright framework and adapted to international
treaties' language. The present generic licenses would then be transformed
into U.S.-jurisdiction ones. They have based their work on the Berne Con-
vention, deemed to be the primary international framework for artistic
property rights. During the summer of 2006, a first draft of this new generic
license was internally circulated but it still contains many references to
124. See article 4(b) of any Creative Commons Share Alike license, including Creative Commons
Legal Code, supra note 72, art. 4(b).
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U.S. law-most definitions (e.g., definitions of collective work, adaptation,
or of the conferred rights) are still literally borrowed from the U.S. Copy-
right Act, and the general flavor of the terminology and principles used is
still very much American. Since all other countries' versions have been
based on this falsely generic version, converting it into a U.S. license and
replacing it by another generic one also raises the issue of the now lost link
between national adaptations and the primary material on which they are
based.
C. Open-Source patent
The geographical scope of the license is particularly important in
open-source patents, not particularly in terms of the language used in the
license or of the legal system having inspired its redaction, but in the scope
of its grant in relation to the scope of the patent covered.
The CAMBIA licenses state that the patents covered by the contract
are patents listed in the Annex, which are U.S. patents, including "all for-
eign counterpart[s] thereof."125 However, the license does not provide a list
of the countries where a similar patent has been granted on the technology
concerned. It means that the license will lose its patent protection in the
countries where there is no patent, and creators should rely on the fact that
the technology can be accessed only through the BiOS licensing mecha-
nism. The use of the research tool in a country where it was not patented
would then not be considered as an infringement, unless that tool was ac-
quired from BiOS or a player in the BiOS pool on the condition that the
contract be respected.
In practice, it signifies that, for the copyleft trick to be successful in
open-source patenting, having a patent in all the countries where the
exploitation of the patented invention occurs would be necessary to impose
the open source license to such an exploitation. This will, of course, raise
the cost of applying an open-access scheme quite a bit.
As far as the geographical origin of the license terminology and legal
principles are concerned, it seems not to be as disturbing as in the open-
access licenses that apply to copyrighted works. One reason might be that
the patent laws are more uniform across borders than copyright laws are.
125. CAMBIA BiOS License for Plant Enabling Technology, supra note 97, art. 1.7.
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CONCLUSION
Open access is revolutionizing the intellectual property landscape by
introducing a sharing ethos where previously exclusion and control were
considered natural and indispensable. Open access is progressively chang-
ing a narrative of copyright and patent rights that has become, in recent
years, rather constant. Most surprisingly, the shift is born with individuals
and private initiatives and grows with private tools-as if they have given
up trying to compel lawmakers to adopt and defend such a sharing and
public-availability stance.
This move towards the reintroduction of a public domain within the
very exercise of intellectual property, rights should be welcomed since it
forces us to admit that copyright and patent can also be about granting un-
constrained access to works and inventions. However, this paper has tried
to demonstrate that the normative force of the open-access schemes, based
on the legal trick of copyleft or viral contamination, is weaker than the law.
Even though it pretends to propagate through the distribution and modifica-
tion of the objects it covers, the self-perpetuation of a copyleft license de-
pends on many conditions: the enforceability of the licenses, the proper
definition of the derivative works or patent improvements it can attract in
its realm, the compatibility of different licenses applying to many parts of a
creation, and the capacity to apply worldwide. This shortcoming results
from the private ordering nature of the very tool used by the open-access
project, the license, and ultimately qualifies the pretense of the copyleft
effect to endow the private tool of the contract with a broader ambit.
The private ordering nature of the mechanisms put in place in open-
access projects has other consequences. The recipients of the copyleft
"law" are necessarily only the authors or inventors adhering to such an
ideology and system; it could never apply to rights owners whose proprie-
tary exercise of their rights is criticized and fought by the commons propo-
nents. More fundamentally, the open-access strategy, through its reliance
on contract and assertion of rights, includes a narrative of exclusivity that is
particularly disturbing when applied to uncopyrighted or unpatented ob-
jects. It then negates the lack of protection that the public ordering shaping
the intellectual property regimes has established.
In consequence, public ordering still has a crucial role to play to mod-
erate the expansion of intellectual property and to ensure that intellectual
creations remain available to the public. The balance that should be an
essential part of any copyright or patent regime (to ensure the access to the
creations or to foster innovation) is one that should be achieved through a
public debate and by traditional lawmaking. Open access is an ideology
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that can (and probably will) permeate the exercise of some intellectual
rights, giving at the end of the day the impression that the pressure of intel-
lectual property on access to and sharing of knowledge is less constraining.
Transforming this impression into a fact and extending it to all intellectual
products likely to be covered by copyrights and patents requires continually
urging lawmakers to be particularly cautious when extending the scope of
intellectual property, the ambit and duration of its rights, or when curbing
its limitations or fair use. It is necessary to make copyright and patent laws
into a resistance struggle to the increasing commodification that threatens
to choke the intellectual property regime by hypertrophy and self-
suffocation. Exercising the rights with no exclusionary objective, as open
access does, might help. But critical legal changes are also necessary to
suppress, within the law itself, the exclusion-based principles when they
are not needed, to insert more limitations and places for free access and
enjoyment of creations and inventions, and to provide for the proper legal
dykes to restrain undue privatization of our culture and science.
Relying solely on open-access private initiatives to open up intellec-
tual property, to insufflate therein more freedoms and public domain flavor,
is also an unsatisfying exercise. In international and national lawmaking
today, open access is often used in discussion about fair use and public
domain to demonstrate that the necessity of providing for a balance in intel-
lectual property is satisfied by such private initiatives. The risk is that open-
access strategies will serve as an excuse to evacuate the issues of public
domain and copyright or patent limitations from the public discussion and
lawmaking-as if commons-based creations were a sufficient answer.
Introducing a sharing ethos within the very regime of copyright and
patents should not be entrusted only to private authors and inventors but
should stay on the agenda of lawmakers, whether national or international.
Public ordering, by deciding the norms applicable to our society, has an
equally inherent viral nature and contaminates each object it governs.
Without denying the usefulness of commons-based initiatives, one could
also ensure that open access, public availability, and sharing are viruses
that public ordering in copyright and patent laws can and should propagate.
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